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In this paper, we apply the duality approach, which is generally used in a static framework, to
a two-sector overlapping generations model. Applying the duality approach enables one to
determine clearly the welfare effects of a transfer and to explain how the transfer paradox
might occur. Especially, we showed that whether the transfer paradox occurs depends on two
effects: the dynamic terms-of-trade effect and the capital accumulation effect.
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In this paper, we apply the duality approach, which is generally used in a static 
framework, to a two-sector overlapping generations model. Our objective is to clearly 
determine the welfare effects of international transfers and to demonstrate how the 
transfer paradox can occur. 
The first classic analytical work on the transfer paradox was by Samuelson (1952, 
1954). He showed that in a perfectly competitive, two-good, two-country, distortion-free 
and Walrasian-stable world, the transfer paradox cannot occur. That is, international 
transfers cannot result in enrichment of the donor and impoverishment of the recipient. 
This is because the direct income transfer effect always dominates the indirect 
terms-of-trade effect. Subsequently, many researchers have investigated the transfer 
paradox, having relaxed the assumptions made by Samuelson. Most studies based on 
static frameworks have applied the duality approach. This is because this approach 
makes it easier to analyze the welfare effects of international transfers. In particular, 
Kemp (1992) revised the work of Samuelson (1952, 1954) by applying the duality ap-
proach. 
The seminal paper that deals with the transfer paradox in a dynamic framework is by 
Galor and Polemarchakis (1987). They used a two-country, one-sector overlapping gen-
erations model. They showed that the transfer paradox may occur; that is, in a steady 
state that does not comply with the golden rule, the direct transfer effect may be domi-
nated by the (indirect) capital-accumulation effect. Based on this work, to clarify how 
the transfer paradox may occur in a dynamic framework, Haaparanta (1989) incorpo-
rated government bonds and Yanagihara (1998) incorporated public goods. Shinozaki 
and Yanagihara (2006) used a two-sector overlapping generations model to show how 
paradoxical results can arise. 
However, no study has yet applied the duality approach in a dynamic framework. 
Therefore, in this paper, we reconsider the results obtained by Shinozaki and Yanagihara 
(2006) by applying the duality approach. This approach has been used by Ihori (1996) 
in a one-sector overlapping generations model. 
 
2. The Duality Approach 
Our formulation is a straightforward extension of Galor and Lin’s (1997) two-country, 
two-sector overlapping generations model, which is based on Galor’s (1992) pioneering 
work based on a one-country, two-sector overlapping generations model. 
 1Consider a world consisting of two countries, the donor and the recipient, denoted by 
 and    respectively, which are identical in all respects except for their rates of time 
preference. Economic activity takes place over an infinite discrete-time period and is 
conducted under perfect competition and certainty. Each country produces a pure (per-
ishable) consumption good, 
D R
X , and a pure (nonperishable and nonconsumable) capital 
good,  Y , traded in every period,  . Both goods are produced from two factors, capital 
and labor. Because it is assumed that there is no population growth, the supply of labor 
in each country is  , for all  , where    is the total labor supply 
(or population) in country   in  period  . Labor is fully employed in either production 
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production, the stock of capital in period  1 + t ,  , is equal to the quantity of the 
capital good owned by country   in period 
i
t 1 + K





tt kK L ++ ≡ 1
i












t k 1 + =
i k0
The production of both goods takes place under constant returns to scale in capital and 
labor. In country   in period  i t, the output of the consumption good, 
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respectively, where   is the capital-labor ratio in sector   of country  . Suppose 
that labor and capital are perfectly mobile between sectors but are immobile interna-
tionally, and that the capital good is capital intensive. The factor payments of each sec-
tor in country   are therefore characterized by the first-order conditions for profit 
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 2where  ,   and    are the returns to capital, the wage rate and the relative price of 
the consumption good in terms of the capital good in period  , respectively. In this 
context, the subscripts in a function represent the partial derivatives of that function 
with respect to the corresponding variables; that is, 
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(1) and (2), the factor prices,   and  , can be expressed as functions of  ; that is,  t r t w
( ) t t w w = p  and  ( ) t t p r r = . Therefore, given   and  , for country   in period 
i
t k t p i t, 
in per capita terms, the quantity of the consumption good,  , and the output of the 
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Note that, under free trade, which implies that   (where   denotes the 










t), factor prices and rela-
tive prices are equal in both countries. 
We assume that, in each period, there are two types of individuals; those from the 
young generation and those from the old generation. In each country, individuals, who 
live for two periods, are identical within and between generations. During the first pe-
riod of their lifetimes, individuals supply one unit of labor inelastically in exchange for 
wage income of  . Consider a permanent transfer from country   to country  . 
The net income of country  , denoted by   (with 
t w D R
i t τ t w t τ −  and  tt w τ +  being the net 
incomes of the young in countries   and  , respectively) is split between consump-





t s . Savings earn the given gross rate of return,  , in the fol-
lowing period and enable individuals to consume during retirement. Thus, individual 
consumption in the second period is 
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The preferences of all agents of generation   in  country    are represented by the  0 ≥ t i
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For determining the equilibrium of the economy, it is convenient to specify the indi-



















Given profit maximization by firms, the minimum expenditure required to achieve a 
certain level of utility, u , given  ,  , 
i
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following solution: 
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Simultaneously, the following savings function is obtained: 
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Consequently, the equilibrium of the economy is described by the following equations: 
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 4Equations (6 - D, R), (7 - D, R) and (8) represent the evolution of the capital stock, the 
individual’s budget constraint in each country   in period t and the world market 
equilibrium, respectively. These five equations contain five variables,  ,  ,  , 
 and  , the parameter 
i







t k + 1
R
t k + t τ  and the given variables   and  . In what follows, 
we omit time subscripts because we concentrate on steady-state properties. 
t p t k
As shown by Galor and Lin (1997), if the capital good is capital intensive, the country 
with the low rate of time preference (the donor country) exports the capital good (the 
capital-intensive good). For analytical convenience, we assume that the capital good is 
capital intensive, and, in addition, we assume that the economy is dynamically efficient. 
 
3. The Effects of Transfers 
To evaluate the effect of a transfer on  ,   and u  in the steady state, we totally 
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propensity to save. Note that because we have normalized  1 i
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  represents Rybczynski’s magnification effect. Hence, we obtain  1 k y 0 < −
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where    represents the Stolper–Samuelson effect, and  0 p r <
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yE s E s y ∆= + − + + −   is the determinant of the above matrix. It can be 
shown that   is not only a sufficient but also a necessary condition for dynamic 
stability. 
Given (9), a permanent transfer from country   to country   increases savings in 




u s  units on the one hand, but on the other hand, it reduces savings by 
D
u s  units in country  . In a static model, only these two terms would appear, which 






uu s s − ∆ − . The novel feature of the present 
model is the inclusion of the magnification effect, which is represented by the term in 




uu s s ∆ − . Because the magnification effect is greater than the 
static effect,  dp dτ  is  negative. 
Applying these findings to (10) and (11) reveals that the welfare effects in both coun-
tries can be divided into three distinct effects: (i) the capital accumulation effect; (ii) the 
dynamic terms-of-trade effect; and (iii) the direct transfer effect. The first term in the 
square brackets of (10) and (11),  ( )( ) 1
dp
p d rr τ −− , corresponds to the capital accumula-
tion effect, which, because we assume dynamic efficiency, is negative in both countries. 
The second term in the square brackets,  ( ) { }
,1 ,2 1 dp ii i
r xc c d τ −+ , corresponds to the dy-
namic terms-of-trade effect, which is negative in one country and positive in the other; 
this is because of the direction of trade. A similar terms-of-trade effect arises in the 
static framework: the only difference is that in the dynamic framework, consumption 
demand is the sum of consumption by the young and old. Effects (i) and (ii) are the in-
direct effects of the transfer. The third term, which is +1 for country R and   for 
country D, represents the direct transfer effect. 
1 −
The transfer paradox can occur if and only if the dynamic terms-of-trade effect domi-
nates the other two effects in country  , and if the capital accumulation effect and the  D
 6dynamic terms-of-trade effect dominate the direct transfer effect in country   (as in-
dicated by equations (10) and (11), respectively). 
R
 
Proposition  If the rate of time preference in a donor country is higher than that in a 
recipient country, a permanent transfer may give rise to the transfer paradox. 
 
Note that in this overlapping generations framework, there is a capital accumulation 
effect. If the economy is dynamically inefficient, this effect is positive for welfare in both 
countries. This is because world demand for the capital good falls by the amount of the 
permanent transfer. In addition, if the economy follows the golden rule, this effect is 
negligible for welfare in both countries. 
Next, we evaluate the effect of a transfer on world welfare. 
 
Lemma    If the rate of time preference in a donor country is higher than that in a re-
cipient country when there is dynamic inefficiency, in which case,   (with dy-





Proof  Summing (10) and (11) in  1 rn < = ( ) yields the condition under 




Applying the duality approach enables one to determine clearly the welfare effects of 
a transfer and to explain how the transfer paradox might occur. In this paper, we showed 
that whether the transfer paradox occurs depends on two effects: the dynamic 
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